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Fairness, Legitimacy, and Selection
Decisions in International Criminal
Law
JonathanHafetz*
ABSTRACT

The selection of situations and cases remains one of the
most vexing challenges facing the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and other international criminal tribunals. Since
Nuremberg, international criminal law (ICL) has experienced
significant progress in developing procedural safeguards
designed to protect the fair trial rights of the accused. But it
continues to lag in the fairness of its selection decisions as
measured against the norm of equal application of law, whether
in the disproportionate focus on certain regions (as with the
ICC's focus on Africa), the applicationof criminal responsibility
only to one side of a conflict, or the continued insulation of
majorpowers from internationalcriminal responsibility.
Selection decisions are less within the control of
internationalcourts than the provision of fair trial safeguards
to individual defendants. This Article argues that international
criminal courts, and the ICC in particular, could nevertheless
benefit from even marginal adjustments in this area.
Specifically, the Article argues that international criminal
courts should focus more on distributive considerations in
choosing from among the numerous internationalcrimes that
can feasibly be pursued with the limited resources available. It
argues that these courts should use selection decisions to express
the norm that international criminal responsibility applies to
all individuals as a means of enhancing their fairness and
legitimacy.

Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. This Article benefitted greatly
from presentations at the ASIL International Criminal Law Interest Group workshop
at SMU Dedman School of Law, the International Law Colloquium at Temple
University, Beasley School of Law, and the Seton Hall Law School annual faculty
workshop. In particular, I would like to thank Kristen Boon, Margaret deGuzman,
Megan Fairlie, Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Aziz Huq, Asad Kiyani, Margaret Lewis,
Alexandra Popova, Jaya Ramji, Alice Ristroph, Peter Spiro, and Jenia lontcheva
Turner for their comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the editors at
the Vanderbilt Journal of TransationalLaw for their assistance. All errors are my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The selection of situations and individuals for prosecution
remains one of the most difficult challenges facing international
criminal justice. In other areas, international criminal law (ICL) has
developed substantially since its rebirth more than two decades ago
with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR). Renewed efforts to prosecute mass atrocities have
produced a growing body of international criminal procedure that,
notwithstanding its shortcomings, is increasingly attentive to human
rights norms designed to protect the accused.' Yet, selection decisions
remain a persistent concern, despite a growing awareness of the risks
to the fairness and legitimacy of ICL 2 and, particularly, to the
International Criminal Court (ICC).3

&

1.
See YVONNE McDERMOTT, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 1
(Paola Gaeta et al. eds., 2016).
2.
See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment:
The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 539, 593 (2005); Mark Osiel, The
Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751,
1821 n.321 (2005) (referencing the inability to indict senior leaders of major powers like
President Vladimir Putin as a form of selectivity detrimental to the legitimacy of
international courts).
3.
See, e.g., Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L.
FOREIGN AFF. 121, 135 (2009); William A. Schabas, ProsecutorialDiscretion v. Judicial
Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 731, 740, 749
(2008) [hereinafter ProsecutorialDiscretion]. For a discussion of the impact of selection
decisions on other tribunals, see, for example, Marieke Wierda et al., Early Reflections
on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J.
IN'L CRIM. JUST. 1065, 1072-73 (2007).
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A key achievement of the Rome Statute, which established the
ICC, 4 was

the creation of an independent prosecutor with the

authority to initiate investigations. Supporters viewed an
independent prosecutor as critical to establishing an effective and
independent international court by facilitating prosecutions based on
considerations of law and justice rather than self-interest or the
power and priorities of individual states.5 Under the Rome Statute,
the ICC Prosecutor can initiate cases without a referral from a State
Party or the UN Security Council. 6 Yet, prosecutorial independence
has proven a double-edged sword, raising expectations that the ICC
has been unable to fulfill. The territorial and nationality restrictions
on the ICC's jurisdiction under the Rome Statute make it difficult to
prosecute individuals from non-state parties, particularly individuals
from the three permanent members of the UN Security CouncilChina, Russia, and the United States-that have refused to join the
court. The ICC not only lacks jurisdiction over crimes committed
within the territory or by nationals of non-member states, but any of
these three countries can block the alternative path to ICC
jurisdiction of Security Council referral under Chapter VII through
exercise of its respective veto power.7
In practice, the ICC's docket has deepened the perception that
the selection of situations and cases for investigation and prosecution
remains heavily influenced by structural, strategic, and political
considerations beyond strict formal assessments of criminal
responsibility. Critics cite the ICC's docket as evidence of various
forms of bias in the choice of situations, from protecting major powers
and their allies from criminal responsibility to focusing
disproportionately on particular regions (especially countries in
Africa). 8 They also point to the ICC's past failures to investigate and
prosecute all sides within a given conflict.9
The ICC's seeming powerlessness to address these concerns,
especially given the continued UN Security Council influence over
selection decisions that is built in to the ICC's design, has limited the
ICC's effectiveness and colored perceptions of its fairness and

4.
Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
5.
Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
ProsecutorialDiscretion at the InternationalCriminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 540
(2003).
6.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 13(c), 15.
7.
Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf, Regionalism, Regime Complexes, and the Crisis in
InternationalCriminal Justice, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 699, 711-12 (2016).
8.
See id. at 712-13 (2016) (surveying critiques of the ICC's selection of
cases).
Id. at 715.
9.

1136

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL 50:1133

legitimacy. 10 In Africa, the ICC faces growing resistance to its
authority and strains in its relationship with the African Union."
Notably, South Africa, Burundi, and Gambia recently announced
their intention to withdraw from the ICC. 12 South Africa
subsequently revoked its decision to withdraw from the Court, citing
a ruling by a South African court declaring the withdrawal
unconstitutional and invalid, and Gambia similarly reversed its
decision to withdraw.' 3 Yet, such signs of resistance, particularly by
powerful states like South Africa, has raised fears of a coordinated
exodus by African leaders that could undermine the ICC's credibility
and survival. 14
Commentators have thus properly focused on selectivity as one of
the most important challenges confronting the ICC and as a recurring
concern for international criminal tribunals more generally. This
Article seeks to unpack the concept of fairness to explain how,
broadly understood, it encompasses not only familiar criminal law
concerns
surrounding due process protections and properly
circumscribed doctrines of criminal responsibility, but also choices
about which situations and cases to investigate and prosecute. The
Article's main focus is on how selection decisions affect the perceived
fairness and, in turn, legitimacy of ICL's implementation by
international and hybrid tribunals. Ultimately, the Article argues,
even the most robust procedural safeguards and carefully calibrated
doctrines of individual criminal responsbility cannot entrench a
court's legitimacy if broader selectivity considerations remain
unaddressed. The Article maintains that addressing ICL's selectivity
challenge is an important component of fulfilling the twin aims of
accountability and fairness central to ICL since Nuremberg.

10.

See Rosa Aloisi, A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security

Council and the International Criminal Court, in THE REALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 147, 149 (Dawn L. Rothe et al. eds., 2013).

11.
Sirleaf, supra note 7, at 703-04, 717.
12.
Sewell Chan & Marlise Simons, South Africa to Withdraw from
International
Criminal
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/world/africa/south-africa-international-criminalcourt.html [https://perma.cc/D6RR-8QM2] (archived Sept. 19, 2017).
13.
Norimitsu Onishi, South Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International
Criminal
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
8,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africalsouth-africa-ice-withdrawal.html
[https://perma.cc/JU4H-LWBF] (archived Sept. 19, 2017).
14.
Simon Allison, African Revolt Threatens International Criminal Court's
Legitimacy,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
27,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/aw/2016/oct/27/african-revolt-international-criminalcourt-gambia [https://perma.cc/4PYW-VTQU] (archived Sept. 20, 2017); David Bosco, Is
the International Criminal Court Crumbling Before Our Eyes, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 26,
2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/26/is-the-international-criminal-courtcrumbling-before-our-eyes-burundi-south-africa-gambia/
[https://perma.cc/D3WKZ4YD] (archived Sept. 20, 2017).

zo17]

FAIRNESS, LEGITIMACY, AND THE SELECTIVITY CHALLENGE

1137

. Part I describes the concerns underlying criticisms of selection
decisions by international tribunals. Part II discusses how these
decisions can impact the fairness of international tribunals and, in
turn, their legitimacy. Part III examines studies of fairness and
legitimacy in domestic contexts, particularly those based on theories
of procedural and distributive justice, and then describes their
implications for ICL. Part IV explores several possibilities for greater
incorporation of distributive considerations in selection decisions by
the ICC and other international tribunals. It concludes that these
courts should make more deliberate use of selection decisions to
express the principle that international criminal responsibility
applies to all individuals and that no person is above the law.

II. CRITICISMS OF SELECTION DECISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW

International criminal tribunals historically have faced criticism
for their selection decisions. The problem is particularly acute at the
ICC, which raised expectations of a more depoliticized application of
ICL through the creation of an independent prosecutor, but which
confronts both design limitations and practical obstacles that make
those expectations difficult to achieve. As a result,- the ICC has
increased skepticism about the capacity of international criminal
justice mechanisms to fulfill the aspiration of equal application of the
law.
In the past, selectivity concerns have had several, overlapping
dimensions. They have traditionally included: victor's justice (the
claim that the winning side of a conflict is not prosecuted); the
insulation of officials of powerful nations and their allies from
prosecution; the shielding of high-level officials while only less
culpable, lower-level officials are held criminally responsible; and a
disproportionate focus on particular countries and regions.
Claims of victor's justice date to the post-World War II trials at
Nuremberg and Tokyo. 15 At Nuremberg, the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) expressly limited prosecutions to the defeated
European Axis powers. 16 Potential Allied war crimes, such as the
bombing of Dresden, were thus excluded from the tribunal's
jurisdiction.' 7 An overarching normative commitment to due process
at Nuremberg, where three of the original twenty-four defendants

15.
See LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw
FOR SERIOus HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 32-33 (1992).
16.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 270.
17.
Gerry J. Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials,
60 ALB. L. REV. 801, 804-06 (1997).
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were acquitted, helped soften criticisms that the results were
predetermined. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMTFE), based in Tokyo, considered only war crimes committed by
the Japanese. The IMTFE was criticized for its exclusive focus on the
vanquished as well as for its procedural deficiencies and retroactive
imposition of criminal responsibililty.' 8 These critiques were captured
in Justice Rahadbinod Pal's scathing dissent, which characterized the
tribunal as essentially a political affair "cloaked by a juridical
appearance" and an exercise in "formalized vengeance." 9
Subsequent international tribunals have shown greater
sensitivity to the importance of prosecuting international crimes
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator. The statutes for the
ICTY and ICTR are neutral on their face as to the identity of the
perpetrator, referring instead to crimes committed in a particular
territory during a specified time period. 20 Moreover, the judges for
these two ad hoc tribunals had no direct connection to the region that
suffered the atrocities, in contrast to Nuremberg, where the tribunal
was composed of judges from the winning side. 21 The ICTY brought
war crimes cases against ethnic Serbs, Muslims, and Croats,
including Croatian generals. 22 In one important case, for example, the
ICTY prosecuted Bosnian Muslim and Croat officials for their
respective roles in crimes committed at a prison camp in Bosnia
where Bosnian Serbs were grossly mistreated. 23 Although the ICTY
arguably focused disproportionately on crimes committed by Serb
forces, 24 it brought "a semblance of balance to its indictments and
prosecutions," 25 and its greater focus on Serb crimes approximated

18.

See RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL

74-124 (1971).
19.
United States v. Araki, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Radhabinod Pal, in
105 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE RECORDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 37 (R. John Pritchard ed., 1981).
20.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
art. 1, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 1, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
21.
See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSDER's GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (A DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY AND ANALYSIS) 3-4, 143-144 (1995).
22.
Victor Peskin, Beyond Victor's Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the
Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 213, 227-28 (2005).
23.
See generally Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (prosecuting officials for
mistreatment of Bosnian Serbs at the Celebici prison camp).
24.
See Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm InternationalizationThrough Trials for
Violations of InternationalLaw: Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to
Trials of Detainees at GuantanamoBay, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 427, 444 (2009).
25.
Peskin, supranote 22, at 228.
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criminal responsibility on the ground, as Serb forces committed the
vast majority of crimes. 26
Proceedings at the ICTY raised a distinct set of concerns about
the insulation of major powers from prosecution. Following NATO's
bombing of Kosovo as part of Operation Allied Force, a group of law
professors filed a war crimes complaint with the ICTY against
American and Western European political and military leaders and
pressed the Prosecutor to bring war crimes charges, including for the
killing of civilians. 27 The ICTY Prosecutor appointed an independent
committee to consider the allegations against NATO and
subsequently informed the Security Council that she would not
investigate further based on the committee's conclusions. 28 The report
distinguished, for example, the use of cluster bombs by Serbian
nationalist Milan Martic, whom the ICTY prosecuted for deliberately
targeting the civilian population of Zagreb, from NATO's use of
cluster bombs, which the report described as consistent with
proportionality principles under International Humanitarian Law
(IHL). 29 Critics nonetheless maintained that the investigation was
biased towards NATO, selectively applied IHL's proportionality rules,
and undermined the ICTY's claim to impartiality.30 They also claimed
that the UN Security Council, led by the United States, excluded the
crime of aggression from the ICTY statute, thus avoiding politically
charged questions not only about the right of various states of the
former Yugoslavia to declare their independence, but also about the
legality of NATO strikes in Kosovo.31 Defenders of the Prosecutor's
decision emphasized that electing not to pursue NATO officials was
consistent with a pre-existing prosecutorial policy of focusing on highlevel officials responsible for the atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia. Beyond the formidable practical and political hurdles, a

26.

See Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the

Indictments, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 45, 93-94 (2013) (noting that ethnic Serbs
make up the largest number of indictees at the ICTY, but also that ethnic Serbs
committed the vast majority of crimes).
Andreas Laursen, NATO, the War over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation,
27.
17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 765, 770-72 (2003).
28.
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY: Final Rep. to the Prosecutor, ¶ 3 (June 8,
2000), reprinted in 39 I.LM. 1257 (2000) [hereinafter Final Report to Prosecutor];
Laursen, supra note 27, at 770-71.
29.
Final Rep. to Prosecutor, supranote 28, ¶ 27.
30.
See, e.g., Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the
NATO Bombing CampaignAgainst the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 503, 503-506 (2001); Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in International
Criminal Law: Our Case against NATO and the Lessons To Be Learned from It, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 95, 99 (2001); Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as
Indiscriminate Weapons Under InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L.
85, 136-37 (2000).
31.
Chris Mahony, The Justice Pivot: U.S. International Criminal Law
Influence from Outside the Rome Statute, 46 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1079 (2015).
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continued investigation into Operation Allied Force did not appear
likely to advance that stated prosecutorial goal. 32

Selectivity issues were more pronounced at the ICTR, which
focused exclusively on crimes committed by one side of the conflict
(Hutu), despite evidence of grave violations committed by the other
side (Tutsi).33 Efforts by the ICTR's former chief prosecutor, Carla Del
Ponte, to investigate Tutsi massacres of Hutus, which the Tutsicontrolled government of Rwanda strenuously opposed, helped
prompt the United States and other members of the UN Security
Council to seek her removal. 34 Such one-sided approaches to
prosecuting mass atrocities triggered accusations of "victor's
justice."35 Cases such as that of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a key figure
in the violence that swept through Rwanda in 1994, also underscored
how political pressures can influence prosecutorial decisions. In that
case, the government of Rwanda suspended cooperation with the
ICTR after the trial chamber ordered the release of the accused Hutu
g6nocidaire based on pretrial defects, prompting the appellate
chamber to reverse the dismissal as too drastic a remedy.36 The
tribunal's exclusive focus on Hutu crimes as well as such instances of
heavy-handed political interference spurred attacks on the ICTR's
legitimacy. 37 The ICTR, however, rejected legal challenges by
individual defendants asserting that their prosecution violated the
principle of equality and upheld the Prosecutor's exercise of discretion
in the selection of defendants absent evidence of invidious
discrimination against a particular defendant. 38 The ICTY reached a
similar outcome in adjudicating selectivity challenges brought before
it by individual defendants.3 9
The choice of defendants also has presented challenges for hybrid
tribunals, which combine international and domestic elements. 40 One
hybrid tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), did

32.
Danner, supra note 5, 510, 540.
33.
Carla De Ycaza, Victor's Justice in War Crimes Tribunals: A Study of the
InternationalCriminal Tribunal in Rwanda, 23 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 53, 54-55 (2010).
34.
Peskin, supranote 22, at 224-226; Mahony, supra note 31, at 1117.
35.
See William A. Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting Situations at the
International Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 551-52 (2010); Simpson,
supra note 17, at 805-06.
36.
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Request for
Review or Reconsideration, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2000); see Danner, supra note 5, at 510, 53031.
37.
Jenia lontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in
InternationalCriminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 593 (2008).
38.
Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Joseph
Nzirorera's Motion for Selective Prosecution Documents, TT 17,19 (Sept. 30, 2009).
39.
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, TT 612-14 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
40.
See generally Beth Van Scbaack, The BuildingBlocks of Hybrid Justice, 44
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 169 (2016) (discussing selectivity challenges at several hybrid
tribunals).
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prosecute individuals from all sides of the conflict. 41 But it has been
criticized for prosecuting only cases of political expediency to the
Sierra Leonean government.42 Another hybrid tribunal-the recently
Institution
Judicial
Specialist
Kosovo
Relocated
established
(KRSJI)-expressly contemplates prosecuting atrocities committed by
members of the victorious party, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),
at the end of the war in Kosovo from 1998 to 2000, thus seeking to
address the perceived failure of the prior tribunal for Kosovo, the
Regulation 64 Panels, to address those crimes. 43 The degree to which
KRSJI will be able to prosecute members of the KLA, whom the local
population widely regards as heroes for fighting a just war, remains
to be seen.
The sharpest criticisms surrounding selection decisions have
been directed at the ICC. The Rome Statute's creation of an
independent prosecutor with the authority to initiate investigations
engendered visions of an international court more capable . of
addressing international crimes free of outside influence. A group of
like-minded
states,
supported
by
various
nongovernment
organizations that played an important role in setting the agenda
during negotiations, insisted that an independent prosecutor was
necessary to counterbalance the Security Council and to enhance the
overall fairness and legitimacy of an international criminal court.44 A
number of states opposed the creation of an independent prosecutor
and sought to restrict the ICC's jurisdiction to referrals by the
Security Council or self-referrals by member states. 4 5 The United
States, for example, cautioned that an independent prosecutor would
diminish the prerogatives of the Security Council and would pursue
politically motivated prosecutions, including into US military

41.
Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 49, 51 (2011).
42.
Mahony, supra note 31, at 1119. The SCSL has also been criticized from
the other direction, with members of the public objecting to the decision to indict
members of the Civil Defense Forces, who were viewed as war heroes because they
fought to preserve the constitutional order. Van Schaack, supra note 40, at 260.

43.

Mark Kersten, The New Kosovo Tribunal-TurningVictors'Justice on its

Head?, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT BLOG (Jan. 18, 2016),

https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/01/18/the-new-kosovo-tribunal-turning-victors-justiceon-its-head [https://perma.cc/9TP9-5KYT] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); see Jaya RamjiNogales, DesigningBespoke TransitionalJustice:A PluralistProcessApproach, 32
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 34-35 (2010) (discussing shortcomings in Regulation 64 panels).
44.
Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Justice without Politics? Prosecutorial
Discretion and the InternationalCriminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 583, 59092 (2007).
45.
Mahony, supra note 31, at 1083-84.

1142

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 50:1133

actions. 46 But despite the Rome Statute's creation of an indpendenet
prosecutor, these fears have yet to materialize. The ICC has instead
largely sought to accommodate the concerns of major powers,
including the United States, which has pursued a policy of selective
engagement with the ICC.47 Situations and cases before the ICC have

thus far largely tracked realist models of international relations, with
stronger states generally supporting prosecutions against defendants
from weaker states because of the lower international relations
costs. 48

Critics frequently point to the ICC's disproportionate focus on
countries in Africa. 49 The ICC also has faced criticism for its selection
of cases within a given situation by targeting one side of a conflict,
such as in Uganda, where the ICC prosecuted crimes committed by
the Lord's Resistance Army but not those committed by government
forces, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the
ICC pursued only crimes committed by rebel and militia leaders in
the Ituri region of the DRC, despite evidence that government forces
had committed the same crimes.5 0
The ICC's treatment of powerful states (and their allies) has
been a recurring source of controversy. The ICC has still not opened a
full investigation into (let alone indicted) any official from a
permanent member of the UN Security Council, including for alleged
war crimes committed by UK forces in Iraq and US forces in
Afghanistan. 51 In addition, powerful states have sought to influence
the ICC's complementarity framework. Under that framework, a case
is not admissible before the ICC if it is being investigated or
prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction over the crime unless that
state is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or

46.
Richard John Galvin, The ICC Prosecutor, Collateral Damage, and NGOs:
Evaluating the Risk of a Politicized Prosecution, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (2005).
47.

DAVID Bosco, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A

WORLD OF POWER POLITICS (2014); Mahony, supra note 31, at 1094-96.
48.
MAximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political
Branches and the TransnationalProsecutionof InternationalCrimes, 105 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1, 2 (2011).
49.
Charles Chenor Jalloh, Africa and the International Criminal Court:
Collision Course or Cooperation?, 34 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 203, 209-11 (2012); Langer,
supra note, 48, at 47 (summarizing criticisms); Ramji-Nogales, supranote 43, at 44-45
(same).
50.
WOLFGANG KALECK, DOUBLE STANDARDS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND THE WEST 91-94 (2015); MARK KERSTEN, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT: THE EFFECTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT'S INTERVENTIONS ON ENDING WARS AND
BUILDING PEACE 164-65, 173-77 (2016). Additionally, in the C6te D'Ivoire, the ICC has
prosecuted only the deposed Laurent Gbagbo and his supporters while excluding from
prosecution supporters of the victorious Alassane Ouattara. See Asad Kiyani, GroupBased Differentiation and Local Repression: The Custom and Curse of Selectivity, 14 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 939, 950-51 (2016).
51.
ProsecutorialDiscretion, supra note 3, at 742-43.
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prosecution. 52 In connection with the ICC's extended preliminary
examiniation in Colombia, for example, the United States has helped
design a transitional justice process intended to prevent a formal ICC
investigation or prosecution by addressing crimes within the ICC's
jurisdiction while also protecting politically powerful actors and
reducing or mitigating sentences for middle and lower-level members
of government or aligned forces. 53
Such criticisms must be tempered by a recognition of the various
constraints the ICC faces and the degree to which the preservation of
major power influence remains part of the ICC's design. Limits on the
ICC's jurisdiction over the international crimes set forth in the Rome
Statute significantly circumscribe its reach. 54 Outside of referrrals by
the Security Council, the Rome Statute confines the ICC's jurisdiction
to instances where those crimes are committed by a national or on the
territory of a State Party (or the State's vessel or aircraft).5 5 or where
a non-State Party accepts the ICC's jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. 56
Moreover, three of the five permanent members of the Security
Council have not ratified the Rome Statute and can veto any Secuirty
Council referral to the ICC, thus helping insulate their respective
officials (and those of their allies) from prosecution.57 Additionally,
the Security Council can, by adopting a resolution under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, request that the ICC defer any investigation or
prosecution for renewable periods of twelve months.5 8 The Security
Council can also shape the parameters of any referrals it makes. Its
referrals to the ICC for Libya and the Darfur, for example, limited the
ICC's jurisdiction to the relevant state under investigation, while
providing immunity from ICC prosecution for officials and nationals
from non-party states for liability arising from operations authorized
by the Security Council or the African Union.5 9 The Security Council
did not fund either referral, placing the full cost on the ICC, and has
done little to support the ICC's investigations in either country.6 0
Moreover, the Security Council, as well as various member states,

Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
52.
Mahony, supra note 31, at 1093, 1104-06.
53.
Kiyani, supra note 50, at 948.
54.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 12(1)-(2). The Rome Statute additionally
55.
permits a non-State Party to accept the Court's jurisdiction over a particular crime on
an ad hoc basis. Id. art. 12(3).
Id. art. 12(3).
56.
Sirleaf, supra note 7, at 711-12.
57.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 16.
58.
59.
Rosa Aloisi, A Tale of Two Institutions, in THE REALITIES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 147, 149, 153 (Dawn L. Rothe et al. eds., 2013)
(discussing S.C. Res. 1593, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005), and S.C.
Res. 1970, para. 6 (Feb. 26, 2011)).
Alex Whiting, International Justice Year-in-Review: Looking Backwards,
60.
19,
2016),
SECURITY
(Jan.
Looking
Forwards,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/28869/international-criminal-justice-2015-part- 1
[https://perma.cclPCL6-BMD5] (archived Oct. 11, 2017).
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failed to act in the face of flagrant noncompliance by Sudanese
President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, who has traveled the globe in
defiance of international arrest warrants issued by the ICC.61 In
2014, the ICC Prosecutor suspended the investigation into the
situation in the Darfur following a lack of support by the Security
Council, including the Security Council's failure to implement
sanctions or take action against States Parties that hosted visits by
al-Bashir. 62 In 2017, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ruled that South
Africa had a duty to arrest al-Bashir when al-Bashir was in South
Africa attending an African Union summit in 2015 and surrender him
to the Court, but refused to refer South Africa to the Assembly of
States Parties or to the UN Security Council for non-compliance with
its legal obligations. 63 In exercising their discretion against a referral
to external organs, the ICC judges explained that such referral would
not be an effective means of obtaining South Africa's cooperation. 64
While the ICC's ruling might be viewed as a pragmatic solution to
ensure South Africa's continued support for the Court, it nevertheless
sends a message to States Parties that non-compliance has no
consequences. 65
The ICC, moreover, has finite resources, limiting the number of
investigations and prosecutions it can realistically pursue. 66 Lacking
any law enforcement power of its own, the ICC relies on states,
especially those with powerful militaries, for such essential tasks as

61.
Carmel Agius, 2015 Brandeis Institute of International Judges Report:
InternationalCourts, Local Actors, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 371, 398 (2016).
62.
David Smith, ICC Chief ProsecutorShelves Darfur War Crimes Probe, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/icc-darfurwar-crimes-fatou-bensouda-sudan [https://perma.ccfYP9Y-UUQC] (archived Oct. 11,
2017). In July 2017, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ruled that South Africa had failed to
comply with its obligations under the Rome Statute by not arresting al-Bashir while he
was in South Africa for a summit of the African Union in 2015. Situation in Darfur,
Sudan; Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision
under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa with the
request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, para. 123 (July 6,
2017). The judges, however, nevertheless refused in the exercise of their discretion to
refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or the UN Security Council. Id. para.
140.
63.
Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II,
Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by South Africa
with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, ¶¶ 123,
140 (July 6, 2017).
64.
Id. TT 137-39.
65.
Angela Mudukuti, Non-Compliance But No Referral-The ICC Muddies
the
Waters,
JUSTICE
IN
CONFLICT
BLOG
(July
20,
2017),
https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/07/20/non-compliance-but-no-referral-the-icc-muddiesthe-waters/ [https://perma.cc/XP7Y-WLQ7] (archived Oct. 26, 2017).
66.
Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the
International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 269-70 (2012) [hereinafter
Choosing to Prosecute].
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arresting suspects and enforcing its judgments.67 The ICC likewise
depends heavily on states for gathering evidence and securing the
production of witnesses. 6 8 These practical considerations limit the
ICC's ability to fulfill its goal of combatting impunity for grave
crimes, particularly those committed by senior government officials.6 9
Further, the suggestion that international criminal justice is
merely a tool for the strongest nations to maintain their hegemony in
international relations must be qualified by closer examination of the
ICC's docket. Most of the situations in Africa under investigation by
the ICC involve self-referrals by the respective African nations
themselves.7 0 The ICC, for example, was invited by the government to
review the situation in northern Uganda, and its involvement
received broad support both in Europe and Africa. 7 1 In addition,
prosecution of only one side of the conflict appeared to be the price of
Uganda's self-referral.7 2 Only two situations (the Darfur and Libya)
have been referred to the ICC by the Security Council and only two
(Kenya and the C6te d'Ivoir) were initiated by the ICC Prosecutor.
The ICC Prosecutor, moreover, commenced the Kenya investigation
only after Kenya failed to take action against those responsible for
the post-election violence there.7 3 African leaders, moreover, have
leveraged self-referrals to insulate themselves and their supporters
from prosecution. Their success in pursuing this strategy suggests
how a simplistic framing that pits a Eurocentric court against states
in the developing world-and equates ICL with colonialism-obscures

Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41
67.
STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (2005).
David Tolbert, InternationalCriminal Law: Past and Future, 30 U. PA. J.
68.
INT'L L. 1281, 1283 (2009).
69.
ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 192 (2005).

70.
See
Situations under Investigation,
INT'L
CRIMINAL
COURT,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx
(last
visited
Oct.
15,
2017)
[https://perma.ce/C2NT-89J3] (archived October 15, 2017) (describing self-referrals by
Uganda, the Central African Republic, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo).
71.
Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck & Eric Stover, Abducted: The Lord's
Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 404,
404 (2008)
72.

ProsecutorialDiscretion, supra note 3, at 753.

73.
Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the InternationalCriminal Court, HUM. RTS.
WATCH
(Jan.
14.
2014),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/14/africa-attacksinternational-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/QMK8-AZCA] (archived Oct. 11, 2017).
More specifically, the ICC Prosecutor sought authorization to investigate proprio motu
crimes committed during the post-election violence in Kenya only after Kenya had
refused to approve the locally sponsored accountability mechanism proposed by the
Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, which had advocated establishing a
hybrid tribunal, consisting of national and international judges and staff, to prosecute
alleged crimes. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, INT'L
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a more nuanced post-colonial reality in which local power structures
interact with international organizations to target weaker domestic
communities. 74
These considerations aside, however, it is difficult to deny that
the ICC's docket contributes to a perception of universal justice as
"universal in name only." 7 5 Further, the geographic distribution of

situations and cases on the ICC's docket has helped enable political
and military elites in Africa (and elsewhere) to seize upon historical
grievances and paint the ICC as a pro-western institution biased
against Africa and other developing nations in order to avoid
accountability for their own crimes. 76
Implementation of the ICC's specialized jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression could exacerbate these negative perceptions. The
Rome Statute initially placed the crime of aggression within the ICC's
jurisdiction but did not define aggression or supply jurisdictional
triggers over it until the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala,
Uganda.77 The resulting amendments to the Rome Statute define acts
of aggression as the use of armed force by one state against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another
state whose character, gravity, and scale constitute a manifest
violation of the UN Charter, and delineate various acts that would so
qualify. 78 The amendments limit criminal responsibility to
individuals who exercise effective control over a state's political or
military action, and who plan, prepare, initiate, or execute acts of
aggression.7 9 The ICC's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is set
to take effect after January 1, 2017, once thirty States Parties have
ratified the amendments and the Assembly of States Parties votes by
a two-thirds majority to activate the ICC's jurisdiction.8 0 Once this
jurisdiction is activated, the ICC will become the first international
tribunal since Nuremberg and Tokyo empowered to prosecute the
crime of aggression. The ICC, however, may exercise jurisdiction only

74.
Kiyani, supra note 50, at 940-41.
75.
William A. Schabas, Regions, Regionalism, and International Criminal
Law, 4 N. Z. Y. B. INT'L L. 3, 14 (2007).
76.
Yvonne M. Dutton, Bridging the Legitimacy Divide: The International
Criminal Court's Domestic Perception Challenge 30-33 (Aug. 10, 2017), 56 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L
L.
(forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/
abstractjid=3016621
[https://perma.cc/5LUF-3BQQ] (archived Oct. 26, 2017); Mark Kersten, The Africa-ICC
Relationship-More and Less than Meets the Eye (Part1), JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (July
17, 2015), https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/07/17/the-africa-icc-relationship-more-andless-than-meets-the-eye-part-1i [https://perma.cc/6FT2-6NU] (archived Oct. 11, 2017).
77.
, Rachel E. VanLandingham,
Criminally Disproportionate Warfare:
Aggression as a Contextual War Crime, 48 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 215, 243 (2016).
78.
Rome Statute, supranote 4, art. 8 bis.
79.
Id. art. 8 bis (1).
80.
Id. arts. 15 bis (2), (3); 15 ter (2), (3).
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over crimes of aggression committed one year after the ratification or
acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties.8 1
Supporters hail this development as an important, albeit partial,
step towards fulfilling the legacy of Nuremberg, which regarded
aggression as the supreme international crime. 82 The amendments,
however, face significant obstacles in achieving this goal and raise
concerns about how jurisdiction over crimes of aggression will
ultimately be exercised.
The amendments' potential impact on the Security Council's
authority to determine acts of aggression by virtue of its exclusive
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security under
the UN Charter proved controversial at Kampala83 The amendments
outline different roles for the Security Council, depending on the
trigger mechanism. 84 In cases referred by States Parties or in
investigations proprio motu, the ICC Prosecutor must first ascertain
whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of
aggression. 85 Where the Security Council has made such a
determination, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation;
where the Security Council has not done so within six months after
the date of notification of the situation before the ICC by the
Prosecutor to the UN Secretary-General, a Pre-Trial Chamber of
the ICC may authorize the investigation to commence.86 In either
case, the determination of the Security Council is not binding on the
ICC's assessment of whether an act of aggression has occurred. 87
Although these provisions help carve out a role for the ICC in
determining acts of aggression,88 the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction
over crimes of aggression committed in the territory, or by nationals,
of non-States Parties, absent Security Council referral. 89 This
limitation is the result of pressure exerted by the United States and
other major powers at Kampala.9 o The United States, for example,
had cautioned that ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression could
discourage states from intervening to prevent humanitarian

81.
Id. art. 15 ter (2).
82.
Julie Veroff, Note, Reconciling the Crime of Aggression and
Complementarity: Unaddressed Tensions and a Way Forward, 125 YALE L. J. 730, 743
(2016); see also Donald M. Ferencz, Bringing the Crime of Aggression within the Active
Jurisdictionof the ICC, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531, 542 (2009) (describing the
value of activating ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression).
83.
Kai Ambos, The Crime of Aggression after Kampala, 53 GER. Y. B. INT'L L.
463, 475-77 (2010).
84.
Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in the
InternationalCriminal Court, 1 U. MIAMI NAT'L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 1, 2
(2011).
85.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 15 bis (6).
Id. arts. 15 bis (6), (7).
86.
Id. arts. 15 bis (9).
87.
88.
Ambos, supra note 83, at 475-77.
89.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 15 bis.
90.
Mahony, supra note 31, at 1110.
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catastrophes because such intervention would bring a risk of
international criminal prosecution.9 1 The Security Council also has
the power to defer any investigation or prosecution for renewable
twelve-month periods. 92 Additonally, States Parties may opt out of the
ICC's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression by lodging a
declaration with the ICC Registrar, prior to any act of aggression
otherwise subject to ICC jurisdiction.9 3 While it remains uncertain
whether, and how, the ICC would pursue crimes of aggression once
its jurisdiction is activated, the controls on its exercise of this
jurisdiction could deepen existing perceptions of major power
influence over the ICC.
Concerns about selectivity also lurk in the background of
discussions to create new tribunals. They surround, for example,
proposals for a future hybrid tribunal for Syria and Iraq that would
focus only on crimes committed by the Assad regime or, alternatively,
by ISIS, despite the evidence of widespread international law
violations committed by all sides of the conflict. 94 Such a focus would
reinforce perceptions of a one-sided approach to international
criminal justice and weaken the chances for lasting peace and
security in the region.95
Paradoxically, ICL's selectivity problem has deepened even as it
has benefited from other advances that enhance the fairness of
international criminal trials, such as the establishment of more
robust due process protections for individual defendants. Continued
asymmetries in the selection of situations and cases-even if largely
the product of a tribunal's design and the practical obstacles it
faces-will hinder the ICC and other international tribunals from
achieving broader goals of fairness rooted in the equal application of
criminal responsibility under international law.

91.
The United States unsuccessfufly proposed language that would have
expressly excluded from crimes of aggression the use of force to prevent genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. See Harold Hongju Koh & Todd F.
Buchwald, The Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109 AM. J. INT'L L.
258, 273 (2015). But see Jennifer Trahan, Defining the 'Grey Area' Where Humanitarian
Intervention May Not be Fully Legal, But is Not the Crime of Aggression, 2 J. USE OF
FORCE & INT'L L. 42 (2015).
92.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 16.
93.
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ratifying the statute subject to reservations. van der Vyver, supra note 84, at 47.
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the Field of International Justice, SYRIA JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY CENTRE 1-2
(June 2015),
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III. SELECTIVITY, FAIRNESS, AND LEGITIMACY

A trial's fairness is essential to its legitimacy in both
international and domestic settings. 96 International criminal courts
derive moral authority from the fairness of their proceedings, and the
severity of the alleged crimes deepens the importance of fairness to a
trial's integrity.9 7 Protections for the accused are thus particularly
significant in an area of law as "politicised, culturally freighted and
passionately punitive as war crimes."98 Trials, moreover, must be fair
not merely in some, but in all aspects.9 9 A trial's fairness is commonly
assessed in terms of its procedures-more specifically, whether those
procedures safeguard the rights of the accused and whether they are
applied equally to all defendants.1 0 Choices about which defendants
and crimes are prosecuted, however, also can color determinations
about a trial's fairness and, by extension, its legitimacy.
Closer consideration of the concept of legitimacy helps highlight
the importance of selection decisions. Various scholars have sought to
define legitimacy, both generally and within the context of
international criminal tribunals. Legitimacy may be broadly defined
as acting with justified authority,iol although some political theorists
have stressed that legitimacy further requires the continuing consent
of those subject to the exercise of political power and not merely the
justness ex ante of the state and its institutions.1 02 Legitimacy may be
divided along the following axes: legal, moral, and sociological.1 0 3
Legal legitimacy describes adherence to legal norms and procedures;
moral legitimacy focuses on the justness of outcomes; and sociological
legitimacy measures the perception of relevant audiences. 104 Thus,
while the first two categories (legal and moral legitimacy) are based

David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the
96.
Legitimacy of InternationalCriminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); Aaron Fichtelberg, Democratic
Legitimacy and the InternationalCriminal Court: A Liberal Defense, 41 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 765, 775 (2006); Sophie Rigney, Case Note, 'The Words Don't Fit You':
Recharacterizationof the Charges, Trial Fairness, and Katanga, 15 MELB. J. INT'L L.
515, 523 (2014).
97.
Rigney, supra note 96, at 522; see also Gerry J. Simpson, War Crimes: A
Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

APPROACHES 15 (Timothy L. H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997).
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99.
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100.
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NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 174 (2007).
101.
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Challengefor InternationalEnvironmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 601 (1999).
102.
A. JOHN SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS 126-30 (2001).
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1787, 1789 (2005).
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on intrinsic qualities or norms, the third category (sociological
legitimacy) is based on perceptions of others.105 In other words, if
normative legitimacy centers mainly on "the qualities of the ruler,"
06
sociological legitimacy turns on "the attitudes of the ruled."1
While distinct conceptually, these categories are dynamic and
can intersect in different ways. Thomas Franck, for example,
described legitimacy as "a property of a rule or rule-making
institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those
addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule
or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with
generally accepted principles of right process." 107 Rights, Franck
argued, are thus "defined, acquired, and protected through the
legitimate and legitimating processes of the community." 168 As
Franck's description suggests, a norm or norm-generating institution
that possesses legal and moral legitimacy is more likely to be
perceived as such, as evidenced by heightened compliance 'among
relevant actors and acceptance by relevant audiences. Allen
Buchanan and Robert Keohane have similarly noted that legitimacy
for global governance institutions implies the moral right of
institutional agents to make rules and secure compliance with them
and, correspondingly, provides a moral reason for people subject to
those rules to follow them. 09
The compliance pull that results from perceptions about an
institution's adherence to principles of right process can increase that
institution's fidelity to those principles through a type of feedback
loop. 110 Abram Chayes accordingly described legitimacy as the
product of a dynamic, negotiated process that rests ultimately on "the
ability of a judicial pronouncement to sustain itself in the dialogue"
with other political forces and "to generate assent over the long
haul." "' Because legitimate institutions typically enjoy diffuse
support, the public will back those institutions' continued operation
1
even when it disagrees with their decisions in specific cases. 12
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Legal and moral legitimacy do not, however, necessarily yield
sociological legitimacy. The decision of a tribunal, for example, may
be justified normatively because it emanates from "a fair and
accepted procedure, is applied equally and without invidious
discrimination, and does not offend minimum standards of fairness
and equity."11 3 The decision may also reach a morally just outcome.
But relevant audiences may still regard it as illegitimate, which in
turn can affect the decision's acceptance within a given society.
In international criminal justice, the audience is often broad and
diverse, encompassing not only the individuals and societies directly
affected by the particular atrocities, but also other states, their
citizens, and non-government organizations and other civil society
actors. 114 Even if an international criminal tribunal has established
procedures that are widely regarded as fair, the tribunal's choice of
defendants for investigation and prosecution may still be perceived as
illegitimate by at least some segments of this audience. In the case of
the ICC, the selection of situations for investigation and prosecution
is most likely to impact the ICC's standing within the broader
international community. By contrast, the selection of cases within a
given situation-and, particularly, the prosecution of only one side of
a conflict where atrocities were committed by all sides-has the
greatest potential impact within directly affected communities. As
Asad Kiyani has explained, such intra-selectivity decisions can create
"a problematic symbiosis between the ICC and domestic
arrangements of power that produce or depend upon systematic
repression or violence" and can reinforce neocolonial patterns that
marginalize certain domestic groups while privileging others. 115 The
Ugandan government, for example, used an ICC prosecution to help
weaken and delegitimize the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in
northern Uganda, while ensuring that the ICC Prosecutor did not
investigate any members of the Ugandan government or military
forces, including by withholding any possible cooperation. The
resulting asymmetry, in which all ICC arrest warrants were issued
for senior LRA commanders, undermined the ICC's legitimacy as well
as the post-conflict process in Uganda by helping frame the conflict
simplistically "as a battle between good and evil.116 This type of intrasituational selectivity, moreover, tends to shield government forces,
thereby reinforcing the "classic impunity paradigm" of a state
sheltering its own forces 1 7 and conveying negative messages about a
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non-government group's moral worth and claim to protection of the
law.118
The Rome Statute requires that the ICC Prosecutor treat like
cases alike and apply a consistent set of criteria to each case. 119 But
an ex ante commitment to treat like cases alike as a basic component
of fairness may be insufficient to achieve both normative and
sociological legitimacy even when coupled with the use of standards
and procedures designed to achieve that goal. The Rome Statute's
threshold gravity requirement, which mandates that cases be of
sufficient severity, provides a potential means of grounding selection
decision in neutral and generally applicable criteria. 120 Assuming
those decisions are made in a nonarbitrary manner through a fair
process-and the chosen situations and cases objectively satisfy the
minimum gravity threshold-the decisions can claim normative
legitimacy. 12 1 But the minimum gravity threshold does not determine
which of the numerous international crimes the ICC should pursue
with the limited resources available.1 22 The ICC Prosecutor's decision
to pursue certain cases from among many potential ones thus exposes
her to potential criticism.123 If the Prosecutor were consistently to
select the least serious cases without good reason, it would
undermine the ICC's normative legitimacy. 124 But even if the
Prosecutor does not engage in such a skewed pattern of decision
making, and even if she provides cogent explanations that address
normative concerns about which situations and cases were selected
and why, it will not necessarily ensure the ICC's perceived
legitimacy, particularly if those decisions collectively resulted in a
predominant focus on particular regions or sides of a conflict. Thus,
even as the ICC becomes more rigorous in its approach to procedural
fairness, it will continue to confront concerns-real and perceivedabout the overall fairness of its selection decisions. Studies of
procedural and distributive justice in national criminal justice
systems provide further insight into this dynamic and the challenges
confronting the ICC and international criminal tribunals more
generally.

IV. INSIGHTS FROM NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Selection decisions are generally regarded as more important to
the fairness and legitimacy of international tribunals than they are to

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Kiyani, supranote 50, at 952.
Danner, supra note 5, at 537.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17(1)(2).
Gravity, supra note 110, at 1440-41.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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national criminal justice systems.12 5 In national systems, prosecutors
not only are expected to pursue the most serious cases, but also
possess the resources and means to do so in most intances. 126
Further, given the volume of cases prosecuted by national criminal
justice systems, the decision not to prosecute in particular instances
is less likely to trigger broader questions about a system's overall
fairness and legitimacy. 127 In many countries, moreover, prosecutors
are accountable to the citizenry through the democratic process. Their
selection choices thus can claim legitimacy because they reflect, at
least to some degree, the views of the elected government and
populace. 128
International courts, by contrast, handle far fewer cases and
prosecutors typically must make hard choices about which, among a
large number of international crimes, they have the resources and
support to tackle. Selection decisions thus assume a greater symbolic
importance.
International
courts,
like
other
international
institutions, also lack the grounding in domestic politics and the
connection to ordinary citizens that national courts possess. 129
Yet, the contrast between the effect of selection decisions on
domestic and international courts may be less stark than generally
assumed. Selection decisions matter in national systems, not only in
high-profile cases, but also in the aggregate. Patterns of prosecutorial
or
judicial
decision
making,
especially
decisions
that
disproportionately affect particular racial or ethnic groups, can erode
a criminal justice system's perceived fairness and legitimacy among
those groups, regardless how equitable that system's procedures are
in individual cases.1 30 Also, the capacity of national justice systems to
prosecute serious crimes varies significantly. Even though courts in
advanced western democracies typically prosecute the most serious
crimes committed within their respective jurisdictions, they too have
faced challenges in ensuring equal application of the law, whether in
confronting white-collar crime 131 or avoiding racial disparities in
charging and sentencing.13 2 States that have weak law enforcement

125.
See, e.g., Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 66, at 268; Alexander K. A.
Greenawalt, Justice without Politics? ProsecutorialDiscretion and the International
Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 583, 656-57 (2007).
126.
Choosing to Prosecute, supranote 66, at 269.
127.
Id.
128.
Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 656-57.
129.
ALISON DUXBURY, THE PARTICIPATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS: THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 30 (2011).

130.
Ben Bradford et al., Obeying the Rules of the Road: Procedural Justice,
Social Identity, and Normative Compliance, 31(2) J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 3 (2015).
131.
KALECK, supra note 50, at 114-15.
132.
Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The War on
Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 73(2) SOCIAL
RESEARCH 445 (2006); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The
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capacity or that lack a strong rule-of-law tradition confront particular
challenges. Such states not only fail to prosecute much serious crime,
including in areas like narcotics and public corruption, but also often
conduct prosecutions in a manner that protects powerful interests
and individuals. 1 3 3 In these circumstances, selection decisions can
undermine the legitimacy of a criminal justice system and public
134
institutions more generally.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that studies of domestic
law enforcement and criminal courts can help inform assessments of
international criminal courts, both in their procedural and
distributive dimensions.13 5 In particular, studies of national criminal
justice systems suggest how distributive considerations-including
the cases chosen for investigation and prosecution-can impact the
perceived fairness and legitimacy of international criminal tribunals.
They also caution against focusing exclusively on the fair treatment
of individual defendants and excluding consideration of broader
patterns of case selection in the administration of criminal justice.
The work of Tom Tyler and others underscores the impact of
procedural justice on local policing and courts. Tyler has
demonstrated how perceptions of legitimacy form around judgments
about the manner in which police and courts treat individuals. By
shaping perceptions of law enforcement and judges, those experiences
help determine compliance with the law.136 For Tyler, fair treatment,
rather than fair outcomes, is the most critical factor in creating a
perception of legitimacy and fostering compliance with public
authority. 137 Procedural justice scholarship thus builds on the
Weberian insight that power is transformed into authority, triggering
a duty to obey, when it is viewed as legitimate.13 8 It has significant
implications for the administration of criminal justice at the local
Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in the Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 433, 439, 462-65 (1995).
Ivelaw L. Griffith, Drugs and Democracy in the Caribbean,53 UNIV. MIAMI
133.
L. REV. 869, 874 (1999); Angel Ricardo Orquendo, Corruption and Legitimation Crises
in Latin America, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 475, 490 (1999).
134.
Thomas M. DiBiagio, Judicial Corruption, the Right to a Fair Trial, and
the Application of Plain Error Review, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 595, 622 (1998) (discussing
Mexico); Steven E. Hendrix, New Approaches to Addressing Corruption in the Context
of U.S. Foreign Assistance, with Examples from Latin America and the Caribbean, 12
Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 5 (2005).
135.
See, e.g., Bernadette Atuahene, The Importance of Conversation in
Transitional Justice: A Study of Land Restitution in South Africa, 39 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 902 (2014) (applying procedural justice to transitional justice in South Africa);
Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International
Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45
VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 405, 418, 456 (2012) (applying theories of sociological legitimacy
to international criminal tribunals).
136.
ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 5-6 (2006).
ToM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
137.
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS xiii-iv, 50 (2002).

138.
Aziz Huq et al., Acts that Legitimate Widening the Array of PredicatePolice
Practices 7 (Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 603, 2016).
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level, where enforcement impacts large segments of the population
and contributes to judgments about the perceived legitimacy of law
enforcement agents, prosecutors, and courts.139 These institutions
cannot continually violate norms of fair process and remain
effective,14 0 particularly in settings where legal compliance depends
more on a sense of moral duty than on a fear of getting caught and
punished for lawbreaking.141
Social identification plays an important role in theories of
positive
helps
generate
justice.
Fair treatment
procedural
identification with legal structures and institutions by demonstrating
that power-holders are acting in fair, justified, and measured ways.1 42
It also communicates to members of different social groups messages
concerning their respective inclusion, status, and value within a
society.1 43 The social identification resulting from fair treatment can
motivate adherence to rules and laws governing behavior144 and
strengthen alignment with state actors and institutions. 145
Conversely, unfair treatment can weaken social identification and
contribute to a sense of marginalization.14 6 Such treatment can not
only convey an abuse of power, but also alienate individuals from the
group that the power holders represent.1 47 This dynamic frequently
plays out along racial and ethnic lines, reinforcing perceptions of
outsider status among particular sub-groups.1 48
Distributive factors also impact the fairness and legitimacy of
national criminal justice systems. Whereas procedural justice
concentrates on the treatment of individuals at the micro level,
distributive justice centers on broader patterns within a society.
The distribution of criminal law has a dual nature. First, it
embodies an exercise of coercive power by legal institutions and
actors-a form of corrective justice designed to punish wrongdoing.1 49

139.

Id. at 90-93.

140.
Morris Zelditch, Jr., Theories of Legitimacy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES IN IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP

RELATIONS 33-53 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001).
141.
Bradford et al., supra note 130.
142.

Ben Bradford et al., Officers as Mirrors: Policing, ProceduralJustice and

the (Re)Productionof Social Identity, 54 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 528 (2014) [hereinafter
Officers as Mirrors].
143.
Bradford et al., supra note 130, at 5-6.
144.
Officers as Mirrors, supra note 142, at 528.
145.
Ben Bradford et al., Identity, Legitimacy, and 'Making Sense' of Police
Violence 4-6, 11 (Oxford Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 41, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2793818
[https://perma.cc/22Y8EDXS] (archived Oct. 15, 2017).
146.
Officers as Mirrors, supra note 142, at 528.
Id.
147.
148.
Id. at 533; TYLER & HUO, supra note 137, at 139-43.
149.
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law,
97 YALE L. J. 949, 982 n.73 (1988).
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This power includes choices regarding arrest, charging, prosecution,
and sentencing. While these choices are directed primarily at
individuals, they can produce racial disparities or other imbalances
across groups when considered in the aggregate. 5 0 Second, criminal
law constitutes a public good or resource that is distributed among
communities and individuals in society.1 5 It provides security and
safety to members of society as well as satisfying public demands to
hold accountable those individuals who breach shared and accepted
norms.1 52 The uneven distribution of criminal law resources across
communities and groups in society not only reflects power
asymmetries, but also can contribute to different perceptions of the
fairness and legitimacy of the state's exercise of criminal law
authority. The media further shapes those perceptions within a
society.' 5
Some scholars have elevated the importance of fair treatment
over distributive considerations. William Stuntz, for example,
maintained that attitudes about law enforcement turn principally on
how law enforcement treats individuals, not on how it selects
supsects or treats different groups collectively. 154 Some domestic
courts have reinforced the focus on procedural fairness for individual
defendants by erecting barriers to claims targeting bias in charging
and sentencing decisions. 155 But the distribution of criminal law
authority-whether as a form of coercion or as a public resource-can
affect its legitimacy even where its exercise is procedurally fair on a
micro level. Institutionalized practices, including how courts and
police treat different groups, as well as background knowledge about
these practices, help shape public perceptions about criminal justice

150.
See, e.g., Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial
Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (2015) (discussing racial
disparities in federal sentencing in the United States).
151.
Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 11 (2010); Loic Wacquant, A Janus-FacedInstitution of EthnoracialClosure: A
Sociological Specification of the Ghetto, in THE GHETTO: CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL
ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 1-2 (Ray Hutchison & Bruce D. Haynes eds., 2011).

152.
Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a
Criminal Law Principleof ComparativeFault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1182-83 (1994).
153.
Huq, supranote 138, at 4.
154.
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L. J. 2137,
2173-74 (2002).
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that
155.
claims of selective prosecution must prove both discriminatory purpose and effect and
erecting barriers to obtaining the discovery of evidence often necessary to sustain a
claim of discrimination); Marc Price Wolf, Note, Proving Race Discrimination in
Criminal Cases Using Statistical Evidence, 4 HASTINGS RAcE & POVERTY L. J. 395,
414-21 (2007) (discussing the challenges of demonstrating claims of racial bias in
criminal prosecutions).
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actors and institutions.156 Excessive focus on the fair treatment of
individuals risks ignoring this larger context.
Criminal justice scholars have drawn on the concept of social
alienation to look beyond the procedural justice framework. Monica
Bell, for example, has addressed the lack of social inclusion across
different groups based on a theory of legal estrangement.1 57 Legal
estrangement theory places the community, rather than the personal
interactions of individuals, at the center of how justice is
experienced. 158 It also considers historical patterns and the role of
collective memory in constructing social identity. 159 Collective
experience, including the experience of how authority and resources
are distributed across diverse communities, helps inform how
communities perceive criminal justice actors and institutions. 1 60
Theories of procedural and distributive justice map onto the
international level in several ways. Legitimacy in the international
sphere continues to depend partly on generally accepted principles of
right process. 161 But it can also depend on the substantive
distribution of benefits and goods across borders and not simply
within a given society. 162 Such benefits may include the equitable
distribution of resources on the prosecution of international crimes
and the equal application of international criminal law authority.
Moreover, the difficulty of securing compliance through coercive
measures in international affairs places greater emphasis on the
compliance pull generated by the acceptance of ICL rules and
decisions as fair and legitimate.1 63 This acceptance is also critical to
the internalization of legal norms at the local and national level. 164
Procedural safeguards, to be sure, remain a sine qua non of
international criminal justice. But distributive concerns als o matter.
International tribunals prosecute a relatively small number of cases,
and the gap between the number of international crimes and the
limited resources available to pursue them remains wide. Further,
international criminal prosecutions often seek to reach a global

156.
CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE
AND CITIZENSHIP 116-19 (2014).

157.
Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement,
126 YALE L. J. 2054 (2017); see also ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY:
CHICAGO AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 365-67 (2012) (discussing a similar concept
under the lable of "legal cynicism.").
158.
Bell, supra note 157, at 2087-88.
Id. at 2106-07.
159.
160.
Id. at 2108-09.
161.
162.

See FRANCK, supra note 107, at 24.
Charles R. Beitz, International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A

Survey of Recent Thought, 51(2) WORLD POL. 269, 270-71 (1999); see also Gabriella
Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT'L L. J. 163, 181 (2011) (describing
the application of distributive justice in the spheres of international trade and the
environment).

163.
164.

FRANCK, supra note 108, at 6-7.
Dutton, supra note 76.
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audience as well as individuals, communities, and stakeholders in
affected countries. The comparatively low number of international
prosecutions instills them with greater symbolic weight than most
domestic prosecutions where, outside a narrow band of high-profile
cases, the audience is at most national, if not mainly local. The
selection of situations and cases for international prosecution thus
conveys a significant message about a tribunal's priorities to multiple
audiences at the local, national, and international level.
Further, international criminal prosecutions rely on legal norms
that transcend borders and justify overriding national sovereignty.
The procedural mechanisms by which criminal responsibility is
imposed on individual defendants can promote acceptance of those
norms and facilitate identification with international criminal justice
institutions through an associative process. But even prosecutions
that are procedurally fair in individual cases can still diminish
increase
and
norms
universal
with
ICL's
identification
marginalization when, in the aggregate, those prosecutions are
skewed towards certain regions or against weaker countries or,
within a given situation, are directed exclusively at one side of the
conflict.
Prosecutions, moreover, are commonly viewed through the prism
of collective memory. International prosecutions that appear to favor
the victorious and insulate the powerful can reinforce a preexisting
sense of dislocation and distrust rooted in past experience. Such
perceptions can not only affect the willingness of governments to
cooperate with international tribunals on pressing practical needs
such as the collection of evidence and access to and the protection of
witnesses, but also. can impede acceptance of the legal norms that
international prosecutions seek to advance and embed within
societies.
Applying lessons of social psychology to survey data about how
affected populations perceive international criminal courts, Stuart
Ford has shown the important, if complicated, impact selection
decisions can have on perceptions of legitimacy.1 6 5 He observes that
groups within an affected country or region are likely to view a
tribunal as legitimate in direct relation to the degree to which that
tribunal's charging decisions support a group's dominant internal
narrative of the conflict. 166 This might suggest that any attempt by a
criminal tribunal to assign responsibility will necessarily cause a net
loss in perceived legitimacy among the affected population as a
whole. 16 7 Yet, Ford also recognizes that this negative impact can be
mitigated where courts help realign dominant internal narratives
with what actually happened on the ground as part of a larger

165.
166.
167.

Ford, supra note 135, at 405, 409-10, 418, 456.
Id. at 409-10.
Id. at 410.
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transitional justice process focused on redressing past violence and
abuses. 168 Prosecutorial charging decisions that seek to apportion
blame among all responsible parties can contribute to this
realignment, while bolstering a tribunal's perceived legitimacy and
strengthening its normative legitimacy by attributing criminal
responsibility to all sides, where warranted.
The importance of addressing distributive considerations is
magnified for courts established to enforce norms of international
justice. The legitimacy of human rights courts, for example, is
influenced by perceptions of the most vulnerable groups since those
groups represent key constituencies that such courts are meant to
serve. 169 Decisions by human rights courts that elevate pragmatism
over principle in response to external pressures can undermine their
credibility and influence. International criminal tribunals similarly
are premised on universal norms of justice and generate expectations
that those norms will be applied in a neutral and equitable manner,
independent of power disparities among parties and states. More
emphasis on addressing distorting influences on selection decisions
both across and within situations-especially where it requires
resisting geopolitical pressures-can help counter perceptions that
international prosecutions are necessarily directed against particular
regions or necessarily serve dominant power interests at the expense
of weaker states or communities.
ICL has, thus far, experienced greater success in the domain of
procedural rather than distributive justice. The ICC provides the
most notable example of this divide, with its elaborate procedural
safeguards afforded the accused, on the one hand, and its
disproportionate focus on countries in Africa at the expense of
international crimes committed elsewhere, on the other. Several
factors help explain this focus, including: the number of ICC
investigations and prosecutions resulting from self-referrals by
African states; the magnitude of the atrocities committed in several
African countries; the ICC's design, which includes significant
jurisdictional limitations and avenues for the exercise of Security
Council influence; multiple practical obstacles from apprehending
suspects to collecting evidence; and a wish to avoid controversial
prosecutions that could inflame opposition and weaken the ICC at a
relatively early stage in its development. But the selectivity
challenges the ICC faces are in several respects a more extreme
version of those faced by all international and hybrid criminal

168.
169.

Id. at 411.
Molly K. Land, Justice as Legitimacy in the European Court of Human
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tribunals. The next Part examines competing approaches to these
challenges and describes other possible ways of approaching selection
decisions in ICL.

V.

RETHINKING APPROACHES TO SELECTION DECISIONS IN ICL

A number of proposals have sought to address selectivity issues
in international criminal justice. While these proposals focus mainly
on the ICC, they contain principles applicable more broadly to future
ad hoc and hybrid tribunals. Some approaches advocate the adoption
of formal legal standards that can be applied equally across a diverse
set of situations and cases. Others emphasize the need to reconcile
the aspiration of equal application of the law with the practical
challenges international courts face and with ICL's other goals, such
as promoting peace and stability in societies devastated by war and
civil strife. This Part describes several of these proposals. It then
suggests an alternative way of addressing selectivity challenges
based on insights gained from studies of procedural and distributive
justice in national criminal justice systems.
A. Approaches to Increasingthe Legitimacy of Selection Decisions
Some commentators, joined by NGOs, maintain that no
individual should escape accountability for grave crimes. 170 This
position is grounded in the human rights norm of equality before the
law.1 71 It opposes impunity for international crimes and thus rejects
the provision of amnesty to individuals who commit them. Although
anchored in retributivist rationales, this approach also contains an
instrumentalist dimension that predicates the establishment of
future peace and stability on securing accountability for past
atrocities. Aggressively pursuing the equal application of individual
criminal responsibility could help international criminal tribunals
resist pressures to avoid controversial prosecutions. At the same
time, this categorical anti-impunity approach faces obstacles given
the jurisdictional and practical constraints under which international
criminal tribunals, and the ICC in particular, must operate. It thus
faces significant barriers as a path to enhancing legitimacy and could
potentially raise expectations beyond current levels of feasibility.
Another approach focuses less on outcomes and more on the
process used to reach decisions. It relies on the notion, rooted in
procedural justice theory, that legitimacy will flow from the fairness

170.
Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 592 (summarizing positions of several
human rights groups).
171.
See Madeline Morris, Few Reservations about Reservations, 1 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 341, 344 (2000).
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of the procedures used to select situations and cases for prosecution.
Allison Marston Danner, for example, has argued that prosecutorial
decisions will be viewed as more legitimate if they result from a
principled and transparent decision making process. 172 Adopting
publicly promulgated guidelines and methods for selecting situations
and cases, she suggests, can help increase fairness and shield
prosecutors from accusations of politicized prosecutions.1 7 3 The ICC
Prosecutor has drawn on this approach, seeking to channel
prosecutorial discretion by articulating overarching standards of
independence, impartiality, and objectivity for the selection of both
situations and cases. 174 Such standards can contribute to a
perception, if not a reality, of bounded discretion and heightened
transparency.
Process-based approaches that rely on the articulation and
application of generalized standards nonetheless have limitations.
These standards do not resolve the difficult challenges in determining
which situations or cases the ICC should pursue from among the
various ones that satisfy the gravity threshold. The Rome Statute's
gravity requirement is intended to help the ICC fulfill its goal of
prosecuting "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole."1 75 But the Rome Statute's lack of specificity
about the meaning of gravity reflects a wider debate among the
various participants who negotiated the Rome Statute over which
situations and cases the Court should prioritize and when prosecution
is appropriate. 176 Disagreement over interpretation of the gravity
requirement arose in the ICC's first prosecution. In Lubanga, the PreTrial Chamber stated that the bar should be set at widespread or
systematic crimes and senior-level defendants who bear the greatest
responsibility for those crimes, 177 but the Appeals Chamber rejected
setting such a high bar. 178 In a separate opinion, one judge explained
that the gravity requirement should exclude only insignificant

172.
Danner, supra note 5, at 536-37.
173.
Id. at 537.
174.
Office of the Prosecutor [OTP], ICC, Policy Paper on Preliminary
Examinations, para.
25 (Nov. 2013),
https://www.ice-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTPPolicyPaperPreliminaryExaminations_2013-ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cclKW65LEHZ] (archived Oct. 6, 2017); OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation,
para 16 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTPPolicyCase-SelectionEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/X53X-UALW] (archived Oct. 6, 2017).
175.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, Preamble.
176.
Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 66, at 283-84.
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision
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concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation
of Documents into the Record of the Case Against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Annex I,
paras. 46, 50 (Feb. 24, 2006).
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Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-169, Appeals
Chamber, Judgment on the Prosecutor's appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I entitled "Decision on Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest,
Article 58," paras. 73-79 (July 13, 2006).
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crimes.' 7 9 The Appeals Chamber, however, did not clarify how the
ICC should choose from among situations and cases that cross the
minimum gravity threshold.
The plasticity of the factors articulated by the ICC Prosecutor to
assess gravity-the scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact
of crimes-can lead the Prosecutor to privilege some factors over
others given the limited resources at her disposal. 180 The term
"interests of justice," which the ICC Prosecutor must consider in
deciding whether to decline to undertake an investigation or bring
charges for crimes that meet the gravity threshold, 1s1 is also
ambiguous. It does not determine, for example, whether and to what
extent the existence of other, noncriminal transitional justice
mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, might
justify a decision not to investigate or prosecute grave international
crimes. 8 2 Process-oriented approaches thus face significant hurdles
not only because of the indeterminacy of the underlying criteria, but
also because of the dilemmas commonly encountered in the
transitional justice setting, where other priorities, such as
maintaining peace and stability can, in some circumstances, weigh
against prosecution. 183 The need to determine when a state is
engaging in a good faith effort to investigate or prosecute
international crimes under the Rome Statute's complementarity
framework injects an additional layer of uncertainty into the selection
process.1 84 At the same time, focusing on the uniform application of ex
ante standards can create an unrealistic expectation that ICL
violations will be treated equally if those standards are dutifully
followed.
The ICC Prosecutor has rejected the need to address perceptions
of unfairness in selection decisions. The Prosecutor is certainly
correct that she should not, for example, seek to create "the
appearance of parity within a situation between rival parties by
selecting cases that would not otherwise meet the criteria"
established by her office.' 8 5 But refusing to allow perceptions of the
need for parity to influence decisions where cases do not otherwise
meet applicable selection criteria is not the same as allowing
perceptions of parity to play some role when choosing from among

179.
Id. Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis,
paras. 39-41.
Choosing to Prosecute, supra note 66, at 295-96.
180.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 53(1)(c), (2)(c).
181.
Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth
182.
Commissions and the InternationalCriminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 481, 498-502
(2003).
Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 653-54.
183.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17.
184.
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OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, supra note 174, at
para. 20.
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cases that do meet those criteria. A more candid assessment of the
importance of perceptions of parity could help the ICC address the
legitimacy deficit surrounding selection decisions, particularly given
the significant resource constraints that effectively require the
prosecution to forego pursuing cases that satisfy the Rome Statute's
threshold jurisdictional and admissibility requirements.
Other commentators place less stock in the neutral application of
legal standards and seek other means of enhancing the fairness and
legitimacy of selection decisions. Some have argued, for example, that
international criminal tribunals should abandon the aspiration of
treating all international crimes the same, at least until those
tribunals gain more enforcement power. Stephanos Bibas and
William Burke-White argue, for example, that tribunals should
instead focus on the most egregious offenses, as measured by such
factors as the number of victims and quantum of harm and suffering
inflicted.1 86
Yet, even assuming one could objectively identify a "worst" set of
crimes from among a broader spectrum of ICL violations,187 this focus
could still produce asymmetric results in the selection of situations
and cases. Concentrating on the "worst" crimes, for example, would:
not necessarily address the myriad of complaints regarding selectiondecisions, from more recent criticisms of the ICC's focus on Africa to
longstanding concerns about victor's justice and the insulation of.
officials from the most powerful nations from international criminal
responsibility. A continued focus on mass atrocities would instead
likely maintain the ICC's current distributive trajectory on selection
decisions since such atrocities are typically committed by weak or
failed states, many of which are in Africa. 88 It also would limit the
ICC's important role in developing and expressing nascent norms in
areas where international criminal responsibility is less firmly
established.
Others question not only the possibility, but also the desirability
of an apolitical international criminal tribunal. As Alexander
Greenawalt has argued, choices about whether, when, and whom to
prosecute in societies undergoing transition after mass violence and
social upheaval can have significant ramifications. 189 Even if
prosecutors could advance the goals of independence and impartiality
by applying objective legal criteria evenly across the board, such

FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 227 (Carsten Stahn
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policies would not necessarily further ICL's broader ends, including
the promotion of peace and stability. The ICC Prosecutor, Greenawalt
argues, should therefore generally defer to decisions by legitimate
political actors at the national level as they seek to navigate the
thicket of competing policy demands and trade-offs facing societies in
transition.190 ICC intervention, he explains, should instead focus on
cases of ongoing and unambiguous ICL violations by high-level
officials. Greenawalt offers a more nuanced view of the Rome
Statute's complementarity regime, with the ICC Prosecutor generally
adopting a less interventionist stance in societies undergoing
transition. His approach could lead to selection decisions more
attuned to local context and more closely aligned with the ICC's
broader aims beyond imposing individual criminal responsibility on
those who violate ICL. But it is unlikely to alter negative perceptions
resulting from the distribution of situations and cases before the
Court.
Other approaches emphasize the symbolic importance of
prosecutions in addressing selectivity challenges in ICL. While they
vary in certain respects, these approaches recognize the expressive
value of prosecuting international crimes. Diane Orentlicher, for
example, has described the utility of exemplary prosecutions. Even if
most individuals suspected of international crimes cannot be
prosecuted, she argues, targeted prosecutions of select individuals
can help strengthen the duty to prosecute under ICL and reinforce
the norm of accountability. 191
A generalized notion of exemplary prosecutions alone, however,
will not resolve underlying divisions over how a tribunal's scarce
resources should be allocated or how a prosecutor should choose from
among various situations and cases that meet the minimum level of
severity. Margaret deGuzman has argued, therefore, that the ICC
Prosecutor should instead focus her finite resources on articulating
and expressing legal norms through illustrative prosecutions.19 2 Such
prosecutions would target particular offenses, such as attacks on
peacekeepers, the use of child soldiers, or the destruction of cultural
sites, to harness criminal law's potential to develop and entrench
norms and values.193 The ICC Prosecutor's recent decision to focus
case selection more on historically under-prosecuted crimes, such as
destruction of the environment, illegal exploitation of natural
resources, and illegal dispossession of land, acknowledges the utility

190.
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191.
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192.
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of illustrative prosecutions. 194 This expressive approach thus
prioritizes representative cases to strengthen both the impact and
legitimacy of prosecutorial choices.
Reorienting the focus around the expression of norms through
the prosecution of representative cases is particularly suited to
international tribunals, such as the ICC, where the number of
potential prosecutions greatly exceeds capacity and where
dependence on state cooperation remains a persistent challenge. It
also offers an opportunity to build support among diverse
constituencies if those norms are identified through a collaborative
and inclusive process that incorporates local actors. Yet, this focus
does not directly address the issues underlying the longstanding
perception of selection bias or its causes. Prioritizing the expression of
certain international criminal law norms may still result in the
disproportionate prosecution of cases from a particular region, a focus
on one party to a conflict even where crimes are committed by all
sides, and the insulation of officials from powerful states and their
allies from prosecution when they commit international crimes.
B. IncorporatingDistributiveConsiderationsinto Selection Decisionsr,
As described above, the legitimacy of the ICC and other
international tribunals depends on their fairness, both objective and
perceived, and fairness has both procedural and substantive
dimensions. One of the most difficult challenges for international
tribunals is overcoming the perceived unfairness of selection
decisions. International tribunals could better address this challenge
by focusing more on distributive considerations in the selection of
situations and cases, a path the ICC has thus far resisted. 9 5 In
particular, the ICC and other international criminal tribunals should
seek to express the principle that no person is above the law-both
across and within situations-through their decisions to investigate
and, where the evidence supports it, to prosecute. Even modest steps
in this direction could contribute to an alternative narrative about
selection patterns and help counteract the perception that
international criminal justice merely tracks the preferences of the
strong and their supporters.1 96
There are several possible paths for incorporating distributive
considerations in the selection of situations and cases. At the ICC, the
Office of the Prosecutor could make communicating the principle that
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no one is above the law an express goal in order to expand the ICC's
geographic focus and anchor a commitment to pursuing international
crimes committed by major powers, to the extent they fall within its
jurisdiction. The Prosecutor could also prioritize her investigation of
state actors to overcome past patterns of sheltering state forces and
better ensure the prosecution of all sides of a conflict where
warranted by the evidence. This prioritization would be consistent
with the Rome Statute's gravity requirement since state involvement
represents "the archetype of international crime and paradigm of
impunity." 197 It also would be consistent with the ICC's goal of
securing "lasting respect for the enforcement of international
justice,"19 8 since achievement of those ends depends on the ICC's
maintaining support among its various constituencies.
The ICC Prosecutor could additionally consider distributive goals
within the "interests of justice" analysis under the Rome Statute.
Specifically, the Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor may
decline to initiate an investigation or pursue a prosecution where she
concludes it would not serve "the interests of justice." 199 This
provision is designed to give the Prosecutor discretion not to proceed
in exceptional cases that warrant departure from the Rome Statute's
overarching anti-impunity norm.2 00 The goal of communicating the
principle of equal applicatioi of law, long regarded as a cornerstone of
the rule of law,2 0 could thus provide a reason for the ICC Prosecutor
not to exercise this discretion and instead proceed with an
investigation or prosecution that satisfies the statutory requirements
of gravity and complementarity and falls within the ICC's
jurisdiction. Also, the Pre-Trial Chamber could consider the
importance of expressing this principle in its review of a decision by
the ICC Prosecutor not to open a formal investigation or to pursue a
prosecution based on the interests of justice. 202 Statutes for future
international and hybrid tribunals could be drafted in a way that not
only exposes all sides of the relevant conflict to potential prosecution
for the commission of international crimes, but also makes expressing
the even-handed application of individual criminal responsibility an
explicit aim.
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Additionally, ICC prosecutors and investigators could seek to
identify opportunities to lessen their reliance on state cooperation for
conducting investigations. The increased ability of individuals to
document international crimes and upload them to the Internet by
means of smart phones with cameras and connectivity, for example,
could help decrease the dependence of ICC investigators on state
authorities for gathering evidence of international crimes. 203 While
the ICC will still need to rely heavily on states to arrest suspects and
bring them to The Hague, and while the Court will have to ensure the
authenticity and security of video evidence, Auch technological
advances could provide the ICC with greater independence from state
authorities in gathering evidence and selecting cases.
Limited resources, structural constraints, and practical
challenges on the ground will continue to hinder the equal application
of international criminal responsibility. Moreover, equal application
of law itself resists reduction to a quota or other easily quantifiable
form. Yet the ICC and other international criminal tribunals could
soften attacks on the fairness of their selection decisions and
reinforce their legitimacy by drawing on the power of expressive
prosecutions to communicate the norm that no person is above the:
law, much as the ICC has sought to express other norms through the
prosecution of certain crimes, such as the use of child soldiers and the
destruction of cultural property.
Placing more emphasis on the equal application of law could, to
be sure, potentially prompt a tribunal, such as the ICC, to take action
that has the unintended effect of weakening its credibility. The ICC is
understandably hesitant to alienate countries on which it depends for
support in crucial areas such as collecting evidence, arresting
suspects, and securing witness cooperation. 204 Prosecutions that have
major power support, such as those based on Security Council
referrals, tend to stand on firmer ground. 205 Further, unsuccessful
efforts to pursue high-level officials from non-cooperative states could
backfire, causing the ICC to look weak and ineffective. The ICC's
inability to secure the arrest of indicted Sudanese president Omar alBashir and its failed prosecution of senior Kenyan officials, including
current president Uhuru Kenyatta, highlight this risk, although
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negative perceptions stemming from the ICC's disproportionate focus
on Africa help explain the intensity of the backlash against the ICC
in both situations.
While valid, these concerns could be mitigated if prosecutions
designed to express the principle of equal application of law remained
focused primarily on morally unambiguous crimes. In seeking to
widen its geographic focus and, in particular, to confront
international crimes committed by more powerful countries, the ICC
Prosecutor could concentrate on instances where the legal norms are
articulated in absolute terms, such as the intentional killing of
civilians or the torture and other mistreatment of prisoners. 206 The
alleged torture and abuse of detainees by UK forces in Iraq and by US
forces in Afghanistan fall within this category. Non-prosecution of
such conduct not only erodes these norms, but also sends the broader
message that more powerful countries are above the law, thus
tainting the ICC's goal of ending impunity for grave crimes. An
international prosecutor, by contrast, might proceed more cautiously
where the norm is less clearly defined or more challenging to apply in
practice because it is articulated as a general standard whose
application requires a balance of factors, such as the use of force that
unintentionally causes disproportionate civilian harm and death (as
opposed to the intentional killing of civilians, which is necessarily a
war crime). 20 7
The ICC Prosecutor initially declined to open an investigation
into UK forces' alleged mistreatment of prisoners in Iraq based on an
assessment of relative gravity, which focused on the comparatively
low number of victims there when measured against the number of
victims in mass atrocities committed elsewhere. 20 8 The Prosecutor
has since reopened a preliminary examination into possible crimes
committed by UK forces in Iraq and has been conducting a
preliminary examination in Afghanistan, including into possible
crimes committed by US forces. 209 A report on ICC investigative
activities issued just prior to the release of the executive summary of
the U.S. Senate Intelligence. Committee's report on CIA torture in
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December 2014 indicated that American officials were potential
targets. 210 The ICC Prosecutor recently announced that there was a
reasonable basis to conclude that US soldiers and CIA agents had
committed war crimes in Afghanistan, including torture, suggesting
the likelihood that she would open a full investigation. 21 1 Neither the
United Kingdom nor the United States has demonstrated a genuine
willingness to prosecute the alleged international crimes. 212
Despite the relatively low number of victims compared to mass
atrocities, prosecuting torture and forced disappearance committed by
powerful states may be justified under a relative gravity assessment
given the threat to bedrock international norms and the alarm such
misconduct causes in the international community. This is
particularly true where, as in the case of the US secret detention and
torture program, the offending conduct emanated from the highest
levels of the government. 213 Both situations present an opportunity
for the ICC to show that it will pursue allegations of state-sponsored
torture even when committed by the most powerful countries.
Further action by the ICC Prosecutor could strengthen the ICC's
overall reputation and legitimacy even if such action triggered strong
2
opposition and ultimately proved unsuccessful. 14

The ICC's authorization for the Prosecutor to open a proprio
motu investigation into possible war crimes committed in the
Republic of Georgia represents another potentially signficant
development. The ICC Prosecutor is investigating the ethnic
cleansing of Georgians from the breakaway region of South Ossetia as

210.
OFFICE OF THE
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON
ACTIVITIES 22, para.
94 (2014), https://www.icc

(archived
[https://perma.cc/S39N-DL3U]
cpi.int/icedocs/otp/OTP-Pre-Exam-2014.pdf
Oct. 15, 2017).
211.
OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 47 (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PEENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4ZGQUBQ] (archived Oct. 11, 2017); Somini Sengupta & Marlise Simons, U.S. Forces May
Have Committed War Crimes in Afghanistan, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/worldlasia/united-states-torture2016),
afghanistan-international-criminal-court.html [https://perma.cc/Q5BX-F5AD]
(archived Oct. 6, 2017).
212.
Aoife Duffy, Searching for Accountability: British-ControlledDetention in
Southeast Iraq, 2003-2008, 10 INT'L J. TRANSNAT'L JUSTICE 410, 429-30 (2016)
(describing the unwillingness of the United Kingdom to prosecute abuses of detainees
by UK forces in Iraq and to penetrate the culture of impunity surrounding security
force actions there); Sudha Setty, Obama's National Security Exceptionalism, 91 CHI.KENT L. REV. 91, 97 (2015) (noting the failure of the United States to prosecute serious
allegations of US torture).
Heller, supra note 188, at 244.
213.
214.
Mark Kersten, Whatever Happens, the ICC's Investigation into US Torture
in Afghanistan is a Win for the Court, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/11/17/whatever-happens-the-ices-investigation-into[https://perma.cc/H9LF-2DZ8]
us-torture-in-afghanistan-is-a-win-for-the-court/
(archived Oct. 6, 2017).

1170

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL 50:1133

well as direct attacks on peacekeepers. 215 The investigation into
crimes committed during the conflict in and around South Ossetia,
which involved Georgia, Russia, and pro-Russian separatists, marks
the ICC's first investigation into a situation outside the African
continent. 216 It also represents the first instance in which ICC
prosecutors are conducting an official investigation into the alleged
crimes of a leading world power. 217
Negative perceptions about the ICC's fairness and legitimacy
will persist if the ICC fails to address the distributive dimensions of
its selection decisions. The ICC necessarily remains constrained by
limits on its jurisdiction under the Rome Statute. The ICC Prosecutor
also cannot realistically ignore the larger geopolitical context in
which the Court operates. But the Prosecutor can help counteract
these perceptions by seeking to express the norm that no individual is
above the law through her choice of investigations and prosecutions.
Pursuing this goal not only would reinforce the principle of equal
application of law, but also could prove, a more pragmatic approach
than it might first seem by building broader support for the ICC and
strengthening the ICC's reputation for fairness.

VI. CONCLUSION

The selection of situations and cases will likely remain one of the
most vexing challenges facing the ICC and other international
tribunals. Past experience has shown not only how difficult this
challenge is to overcome, but also how important it is to a tribunal's
fairness and legitimacy. One important lesson from studies of
national criminal justice systems is that fairness has both procedural
and distributive dimensions. International criminal tribunals have
made significant strides in incorporating elements of procedural
justice through the development of safeguards that protect the fair
trial rights of those accused of committing international crimes. But
they continue to lag on the distributive side and have failed to
entrench the principle that international criminal responsibility
applies equally to all individuals. This Article suggests that
international courts and the ICC in particular could benefit from

215.
ICC authorizes Russia-Georgiawar crimes investigation, BBC NEWS (Jan.
17, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35422437
[https://perma.cc/AD6T87FP] (archived Oct. 6, 2017).
216.
Mark Kersten, Why is the International Criminal Court stepping out of
Africa
and
into
Georgia?,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
6,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/05/why-is-theinternational-criminal-court-stepping-out-of-africa-and-intogeorgia/?utmterm=.2dc3e669220e
[https://perma.cc/98QJ-5U8J] (archived Oct. 6,
2017).
217.
Id.

2017]

FAIRNESS, LEGITIMACY, AND THE SELECTIVITY CHALLENGE

1171

greater attention to distributive considerations in selecting from
among the numerous international crimes that could potentially be
pursued with the limited resources available. A more concerted effort
to use selection decisions to express the norm that international
criminal responsibility applies to all individuals offers one means of
achieving this result.

